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ABSTRACT 
 
Rare earth elements (also referred to as rare earth minerals, rare earth metals, green elements, 
rare earths or simply REEs) are comprised of 17 elements of the periodic table. The metals are 
often found combined together in ores and must be separated into its individual elements.  On the 
supply side of the market, China is currently the largest producer of rare earth elements in the 
world, mining at least 90% of total world production. Consequently, many countries around the 
world rely on imports of these REEs to facilitate production of the various systems and products 
that are dependent on the rare earth metals as raw materials. With one supplier effectively 
monopolizing the rare earth industry, this imposes severe supply-chain risks to the producers of 
products that rely on rare earth minerals.  After several actions that have restricted the supply, the 
United States, the European Union, and Japan have challenged China for violating provisions of 
its membership in the World Trade Organization.  This paper will examine the rare earth industry, 
China’s near-monopoly, global supply-chain risks, and strategies to reduce dependence on China, 
including the invocation of the WTO’s dispute resolution process.  
 
Keywords:  Rare Earth Minerals; Rare Earth Elements; Rare Earth Metals 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
are earth elements (also referred to as rare earth minerals, rare earth metals, green elements, rare 
earths or simply REEs) are comprised of 17 elements of the periodic table which include 15 elements 
from the group known as lanthanides and two additional elements known as scandium and yttrium. 
The metals are often found combined together in ores and must be separated into its individual elements.  
 
THE DEMAND SIDE OF THE MARKET 
 
 The various applications of rare earth elements are numerous and can be broadly classified into four major 
categories, namely: High Technology Consumer Products, Environmentally Friendly Products, Industrial and 
Medical Devices and National Defence Systems. In the United States, estimated data through the first eight months 
of 2011 showed the distribution of rare earths by end use as follows: chemical catalysts for automotive and 
petroleum refining, 47%; metallurgical applications and alloys, 13%; alloys, 11%; glass polishing and ceramics, 
10%; permanent magnets for electric and hybrid vehicles, 9%; ceramics, 5%; phosphors for computer monitors, 
lighting, radar TVs, and x-ray intensifying film, 5%. (USGS 2012). The demand for such high technology products 
is steadily increasing in both the US and globally, causing an upsurge in the derived demand for rare earth metals. 
For an overview of the rare earths market, see Giacalone (2012). 
 
CHINA’S CURRENT NEAR-MONOPOLY ON THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE MARKET 
 
 At present China is the largest producer of Rare Earth elements in the world, mining, by various estimates, 
at least 90% of total world production. Consequently, many countries, including the United States and Japan, rely on 
imports of these REEs from China to facilitate production of the various systems and products that are reliant on rare 
earths as raw material. For example, Japan relies on imports from China to produce the rechargeable batteries used 
to power the hybrid vehicles and several other products that it exports to the United States and other countries. It is 
not unreasonable to assume that a contraction in the global supply of rare earth minerals can adversely affect Japan.  
R 
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 China has managed to capitalize on the rare earth element industry by developing the resources 
(technology, techniques and an experienced labor force) required to efficiently and effectively mine, extract, 
separate and refine rare earth minerals at more operationally feasible costs than other countries. As a result, it 
became more economically viable for countries, such as the United States, to cease production of rare earth minerals 
and import these minerals from China. This operational efficiency has caused China to effectively emerge as the 
leading supplier of rare earth minerals to an extent that could be easily equated to a monopoly.  The fact that China 
controls the global supply of rare earth metal allows the country to effectively control quality, quantity and 
ultimately the prices of these rare earth elements through export quotas and trade tariffs.  
 
Rare earth elements are not as rare as the name implies. They are reasonably abundant in the earth’s crust, 
even more so than other familiar metals like gold, iron or copper. Thus, the fact that China mines virtually all of 
total global production is not an indication that the majority of rare earth elements are located in that part of world. 
As a matter of fact, from as early as 1953, the United States was a major producer of rare earth elements before 
suspending operations at its 55 acre mine at Mountain Pass located in California in 1998 (Jenkins, 2010). The 
United States has become almost fully reliant on China, importing 79% of it rare earth materials in 2011. Though 
this is down from 92% in 2010, it still gives China the upper hand in this market (USGS, Mineral Commodity 
Summaries, 2012.) 
 
SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS 
 
The Dependability of the Supplier 
 
 There are several supply chain risks inherent in a global market whereby the supply of virtually all of a raw 
material (that is rare earth elements) deemed critical to the development of many products that boosts a nation’s 
GDP is largely controlled by one supplier, in this case, China. At present, “both production of rare earth materials in 
China and export of those materials outside of China are strictly controlled by government imposed quotas” 
(Molycorp Minerals, 2009).  Japan, a country that manufactures and exports many of the parts that use rare earth 
metals, was exposed to and negatively impacted by one such risk. In September 2010, China placed what seemed to 
be an unannounced and unofficial embargo on the export of rare earth metals to Japan—a claim that was repeatedly 
denied by the Chinese government (Humphries, 2010). The incident was initially thought to be related to 
longstanding maritime wars between the two countries but was heightened when China subsequently began halting 
exports to other countries as well. This embargo has led many governments around the world to question China’s 
reliability as a supplier of the critical rare earth minerals and has fuelled the urgency of several nations to curtail 
China’s monopoly on the rare earth metal industry.  
 
The contraction of the supply of rare earth materials by China is neither a new nor shocking issue. Margaret 
Hunt (2010) in her article entitled Rare Earth Dearth states that “experts have been warning of the dangers of U.S. 
reliance on Chinese rare earths for many years” (p.2). This assertion came subsequent to announcements of 
decreases in exports of rare earth minerals by Chinese officials. To further exacerbate the concerns of many nations, 
approximately three months before the apparent embargo placed on Japan, China imposed export restrictions on rare 
earths that resulted in a supply shortage for countries outside of China. In July 2010, “China announced that it will 
cut exports this year of rare-earth elements (REE) by 40%, leaving demand outside China exceeding the supply for 
the first time ever” (Service, 2010a). 
 
Resource Constraints 
 
 Although China produces and refines more than 90% of the global rare earth metal supply, the reserves 
outside of China are estimated at least 50% of the 110 million tons. World reserves refer to the amount of rare earth 
minerals in the earth’s surface that can be economically extracted from mines if the requisite resources and materials 
were made available to do so. Table 1 below shows the recent data on reserves quantities for various countries. From 
this table we observe that those countries such as India, Australia and even the United States each have millions of 
tons of rare earth resources available, presumably enough to satisfy each country’s own demand.  
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 It can be argued that there are sufficient world reserves to meet the forecasted increases in consumption for 
the foreseeable future (Hedrick & Cordier, 2010). However, the wealth of rare earth mineral reserves does not seem 
to be enough to mitigate the current state of crisis regarding an impending supply shortage surging through most 
countries which rely on rare earth inputs. This is because no matter how abundant world reserves are, without the 
necessary infrastructure resources to extract the raw materials from the ground and with continued reliance on a 
China as the dominant source of supply, production will neither be able to meet nor sustain anticipated future 
demand.  
 
Table 1 
World Mine Production And Reserves 
(Data in metric tons of rare-earth oxide (REO) content) 
 
Mine productione    Reserves1 
2010   2011  
United States      —   —   13,000,000(2)  
Australia      —  —      1,600,000  
Brazil      550   550           48,000  
China      130,000  130,000  55, 000,000  
Commonwealth of Independent States   NA   NA    19,000,000  
India      2,800   3,000      3,100,000  
Malaysia     30   30          30,000  
Other countries     NA   NA     22,000,000  
World total (rounded)    133,000   130,000   110,000,000 
Source: US Geological Service (2012). Minerals Commodity Summaries 2012. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 129.   
e Estimated. NA Not available. W Withheld to avoid disclosing company proprietary data. — Zero.  
1That part of the reserve base which could be economically extracted or produced at the time of determination. The term reserves 
need not   signify that extraction facilities are in place and operative. Reserves include only recoverable materials. 
(2) It should be noted that Molycorp Inc. accounts for substantially all of the U.S. reserves and in April of this year, it announced 
a 36% increase in its proven reserves to over 18 million tons. 
 
Why Would China Restrict Supply? 
 
 There are several possible explanations for why China would be inclined to restrict exports to other 
countries. The most evident reason is that as China’s demand for rare earth dependent technologies such as cell 
phones, computers, and flat panel displays screens increase, the country’s own demand for rare earth elements is 
quickly outgrowing its supply. Therefore, imposed export restrictions may not be a malicious attempt by the Chinese 
government to “starve the world of rare earth metals” (Jenkins, 2010), but may be considered necessary to make the 
metals more readily available for domestic consumption.   
 
 Another explanation for reducing export quotas is the country’s possible attempt to stimulate its own 
economy by increasing domestic production of those products like rechargeable batteries and flat panel screens that 
are currently dominated by other countries such as Japan and India. Therefore, imposing such restriction on supply 
inevitably increases the company’s competitive advantage for sale of these products.  This theory was reinforced by 
Eggert (2010), professor and director of the Division of Economics and Business at the Colorado School of Mines, 
who argues that “when China restricts exports of a primary raw material, such as rare-earth elements, it presumably 
is doing so to create an advantage for those manufacturing industries that use rare earths domestically in goods that 
will be sold both domestically and internationally” (p. 56).  
 
 China, itself, argues that it is attempting to bring order to a chaotic and environmentally hazardous industry. 
By consolidating some mining operations, closing some others, and imposing stringent environmental regulations on 
mining and processing, supply reductions can be expected. 
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RISK MITIGATION STRATEGIES 
 
Many countries, including the United States, are readily responding to the increasing demand for and 
contracting supply of rare earth metals. Eggert (2010) suggests that “users of elements for which there are supply 
risks have a number of options...they can maintain stockpiles, diversify sources of supply, develop joint-sharing 
arrangements with other users, or develop tighter relations or strategic partnerships with producers” (p.53). Also, 
more efficient recycling of rare earth materials can assist in curbing the current shortage. 
 
Recycling of Rare Earth Components 
 
Since rare earth metals are used in a wide variety of products that are upgraded on a continuous basis, the 
opportunity to extract them from the discarded items presents itself (Tabuchi 2010). Labelled “urban mining,” this 
recycling allows nations with no significant rare earth mining operations to displace some of its imports and reduce 
some of the supply chain risks. Japan has taken major steps in this direction. After Japanese mining of rare earth 
elements succumbed to the China’s dominance, the country has launched a major initiative to recycle the rare earth 
metals from the tons of laptops, cell phones, and other products which use them. Japan even imports these used 
electronics for recycling. Estimates are that used electronics contain as much as 300,000 metric tons of rare earth 
metals. However, since most of these products contain very small quantities of these metals, the extraction process is 
complicated and expensive. Yet, it provides some relief from the supply chain risks of total dependence on China. 
As other countries have recognized the value of these used electronics, they have embraced recycling as an alternate 
supply source of rare earth metals. China has imposed an export ban on computer mother boards, for example. 
Recycling efforts in the United States are minimal, mainly permanent magnet scrap. 
 
Stockpile Accumulation 
 
Another strategy proposed by several experts to cover supply shortages is the accumulation of stockpiles of 
rare earth oxides. Generating stockpiles is particularly important as a means of meeting military demand for national 
defense and executing the environmental initiatives of the United States government (Humpries, 2010). According 
to the United States Geological Survey, there are currently no government stockpiles of rare earth metals (USGS, 
2012). Retaining no stockpile of rare earths critical to so many high tech defense mechanisms poses a severe risk to 
the United States military arsenal.   
   
Supply Chain Diversification 
 
Though estimates vary, it has been noted above that there are considerable deposits of rare earths are 
outside of China. Even though diversifying the supply chain has several limitations, countries have recognized that 
tapping into their own reserves may be a necessary strategy to satiate growing demand and to counteract the risks of 
further supply restrictions. There are ongoing plans to set up additional production facilities at rare earth mines 
located in countries like India, South Africa and Canada, and arrangements are being made to resume production of 
the mines located in Mountain Pass, California and Mount Weld, Australia.  
 
Molycorp Minerals LLC has re-opened a separations plant at its Mountain Pass rare earth deposit. The 
company is conducting research which is expected to allow this production facility to obtain up to 60% recovery of 
rare earth metals from its ore--almost 30% greater than the current recovery rate currently achieved by China 
(Jenkins, 2010). However, Jenkins argues that the mine’s annual output may not be sufficient to bridge the gap left 
by reduced Chinese exports. This is especially true for the “heavy” rare earths, such as dysprosium and terbium, 
which are critical ingredients for the magnets that operate at high temperatures in motors and turbines.  The 
Molycorp deposits are richest in the “light” rare earth elements that work best in low-temperature applications. In 
any case, Molycorp has entered an agreement to supply rare earths to Japan’s Hitachi Metals, one of the world’s 
leading producers of magnets for applications such as missile guidance systems, hybrid automobiles, and electrical 
wind turbines (Dove, 2011). Hitachi will have to look elsewhere for its requisite “heavy” rare earth metals (Bourzac 
2011).  
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The rare earth deposits of Australia’s Mount Weld are expected to be a significant new source of supply. 
Owned by the Lynas Corporation, the deposits are considered some of the world’s richest. In August, 2011, Lynas 
opened the first phase of a three-phase development that is expected to eventually produce over 33,000 metric tons 
annually. Lynas is involved in a joint venture with Siemens, a major player in the market for powerful magnetic 
devices (Dove, 2011). Lynas has also completed the world’s largest rare earth processing plant in Malaysia that will 
process ores shipped from Australia. Though the plant’s opening has been delayed due to protests relating to 
radiation levels and disposal of waste, Lynas recently obtained a two-year license to begin operations. However, 
activists vow to continue their fight to stop the plant and have even made it an issue in next year’s presidential 
election. So, although the success of Lynas mining and processing operations would provide a significant challenge 
to China’s dominance, there are still major environmental and political hurdles to overcome (Murdoch 2012). 
 
Brazil is another country with reserves of rare earth elements though largely in an undeveloped state. The 
giant Japanese firm, Mitsubishi, and Neo Material, a Canadian firm, are evaluating the Brazilian deposits which are 
estimated at around 20,000 metric tons (D’Atorio 2010). Other potential supply sources include Kazakhstan, 
Vietnam, and India. 
 
Alternatives to Rare Earth Minerals 
 
Research to find acceptable alternatives to rare earth metals is still in the early stage. This research is 
unlikely to develop practical material alternatives in the short-run, if ever. Driving the search for alternatives is the 
high prices of rare earth materials which had been rising steadily for several years. Another factor has been the 
conservation of these costly materials by changing production techniques so as to use lesser quantities. Furthermore, 
the high prices have spurred research into the development of alternative technologies that do not rely heavily or at 
all on rare earth materials (Bradsher 2011). 
 
Though the prices of rare earths seem to have peaked in June of 2011 and fallen sharply throughout the 
second half of the year, they remain significantly above what they were just a few years ago. This was due in part to 
the weak global economy which impacted demand. It was also due to China loosening of its export restrictions. 
Certainly, high prices for key materials will push the search for cheaper substitutes and technologies. And additional 
supplies will exert downward pressure on prices. The net effect of these market forces will be determined over the 
coming years. 
 
The Limitations of Supply Diversification 
 
As was discussed earlier, one way to reduce the supply risks associated with the current rare earth metal 
industry is to diversify production outside of China. However, there are several limitations associated with supply 
diversification in this industry.  
 
The same reasons that most countries opted to rely on imports from China in the first place may prove to be 
the identical reasons that may make it economically impractical to expand production facilities globally—that is, the 
low cost of operations that currently exists in China. Eggert (2010) acknowledged this likelihood when he pointed 
out that “the biggest impediment to the opening of rare-earth mines outside of China is the reality that China is and 
likely will remain the low-cost producer of rare earths worldwide and probably could supply most world demand at 
prices lower than those necessary to justify new mines” (p. 53). 
 
In addition, it would be difficult for other countries to secure the necessary expertise in the form of 
chemical engineers in the short period of time required to meet increasing demand. Karl A. Gschneidner Jr., senior 
metallurgist and one of the world’s leading rare-earth experts, told Congressional panellists in March 2010 that 
“rare-earth research in the United States on mineral extraction, rare earth separation, processing of the oxides into 
metallic alloys and other useful forms, substitution, and recycling is virtually zero” (Ingebretsen, 2010). This 
“shortage of talent” as Ingebretson calls it, could severely undermine attempts by the United States and other 
countries to diversify production and reduce the monopolistic control of the industry by China.  
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Another constraint on diversification is the need to build or re-build the infrastructure needed for mining 
and processing rare earth elements. When companies moved their operations to China, they abandoned their existing 
facilities. New entrants to the industry will have to construct facilities from scratch (Bourzac 2011). 
 
In general, getting the required permits to open or expand rare earth production facilities is a lengthy 
process, from 4-7 years, in most countries. This is because rare earth mining and processing generates toxic, 
radioactive residue. Environmental concerns tend to dominate the permitting regulations.  
 
Legislative Initiatives 
 
In the United States, some argue that government should bear much of the responsibility for facilitating the 
development of domestic production that would reduce the country’s reliance on Chinese imports. The process of 
mining, extracting and separating rare earth elements efficiently and effectively may require the financial aid of 
government to stimulate research and development initiatives.  
 
In the United States, for example, several bills designed to promote domestic production have been 
proposed. The U.S. Magnet Materials Association and industry groups representing primarily the mining, aerospace, 
and defense have lobbied for such legislation. Among them  have been The Rare Earths and Critical Materials 
Revitalization Act of 2010 which supports research and development; the Rare Earths Supply-Chain Technology 
and Resources Transformation Act of 2010 that facilitates domestic production; and  the Fiscal Year 2011 National 
Defense Authorization Act that incorporates governmental strategy for ensuring long term availability of those rare 
earth metals critical to national defense as well as sourcing means to reduce the dependency of military weapons on 
rare earth materials (Humphries, 2010, pgs. 10-12). Most recently, in July 2012, the House of Representatives 
passed H.R.4402, The National Strategic and Critical Minerals Production Act. However, Senate passage and White 
House support has not yet materialized. 
 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
Faced with the difficulties and risks in diversifying the rare earth supply chain, the United States, Japan, 
and the European Union formally accused China in March 2012 of violating the provisions of the WTO with respect 
to trade in the rare earth minerals. Essentially, China was accused of placing export restrictions on the supply of rare 
earth and related minerals such as tungsten and molybdenum. Specific restrictions include export quotas, export 
duties, restrictions on the right to export, and various cost-raising administrative limitations. China dominates the 
mining of these minerals which are critical to the production of many important products, including sophisticated 
military technology. The challengers assert that China is trying to extend its dominance beyond mining and into the 
manufacturing of products with rare earth content. China counter-argues that its export controls are driven largely by 
environmental concerns, conservation of natural resources, and the pursuit of sustainable development. The 
consequences, according to the complainants, are supply shortages and higher input prices than would be the case if 
markets were open. China, it is claimed, reaps an unfair competitive advantage over foreign competition by these 
trade restrictions. Allegedly, it is not following the trade rules it agreed to when it joined the WTO. (Various 
sources) 
 
These political entities can and did call for the initiation of the WTO’s dispute resolution process handled 
by its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The admitted aim of the process is to settle the dispute and not pass 
judgment. The process encourages bilateral or multilateral consultation to reach agreement before any formal 
proceedings are begun. This consultation stage normally lasts up to 60 days. If a settlement is not reached, a panel 
can be appointed. The defendant country can block the creation of the panel one time but, if no settlement is 
reached, the Dispute Settlement Body can reconvene and appoint a panel. This part of the process has a 45-day time 
limit. The appointed panel normally has six months to make its rulings and recommendations. Other steps in the 
process and the right to appeal typically can extend the overall process from 12 to 15 months. 
 
In the current rare earth case against China, the consultation period ended without agreement and the 
complainants requested the Dispute Settlement Body to appoint a panel to investigate the matter. As expected, China 
blocked the creation of this panel. The DSB re-convened in late July 2012, and as per WTO rules, it appointed a 
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panel and China cannot block its action. A quick resolution of the dispute is not anticipated since the investigation is 
likely to be intense and appeals are highly probable. 
 
Some US politicians and pundits have little faith in the WTO dispute resolution process which is likely to 
be extremely time-consuming and enmeshed in bureaucratic procedures. Some argue for more aggressive action. At 
least one US Senator has called for blocking Chinese funded mining projects in the US as well as World Bank 
financing of Chinese mining projects elsewhere. (Areddy and Reddy 2012).  
 
THE MARKET SOLUTION 
 
Can market forces resolve the trade issue before the WTO can take any meaningful action? There are more 
than a few who believe that they can (Worstall 2012). As described above, production outside of China is being 
ramped up in several countries. Previously closed mines and processing operations are being reopened and new ones 
are being developed. The competitive initiatives provided by the marketplace seem to be intensifying. However, in 
the short-run, China still has considerable market leverage. Undoing that leverage will take some time and it is 
unlikely that the WTO can do much about it. 
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